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Case No. 20150454-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff! Appellee, 
V. 
SPENCER SCOTT RICHARDSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Spencer Scott Richardson appeals from sentences for retail theft, a 
third degree felony, and for violating probation following conviction of 
possession or use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony. 
Richardson seeks either resentencing or withdrawal of his guilty plea for 
retail theft. Under Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(e), this Court has 
jurisdiction to consider Richardson's challenge insofar as he seeks 
resentencing. 
, This Court does not have jurisdiction to consider Richardson's 
request to withdraw his guilty plea. Richardson did not move to withdraw 
the plea before the district court announced sentence. Utah courts would 
have jurisdiction to grant relief from the plea itself only in an action filed 
under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b), 
(c) (West Supp. 2015); Grimmett v. State, 2007 UT 11, ,rs, 152 P.3d 306 ("Utah 
Code section 77-13-6(2)(b) establishes the filing limitations that govern a 
criminal defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea. These filing 
liinitations are jurisdictional."). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
While he was on probation for a drug-related offense ("the drug 
case"), Spencer Scott Richardson was charged with and pleaded guilty to 
retail theft ("the theft case"). As part of the plea bargain, the prosecutor 
agreed to affirmatively recommend probation in the theft case and to 
recommend that probation be revoked and reinstated in the drug case. The 
agreement was silent as to whether the prosecutor would recommend jail 
time as a condition of probation. At sentencing, defense counsel requested 
probation, but the prosecutor made no recommendation. Defense counsel 
neither objected, moved for withdrawal of the plea, nor requested an order 
cmnpelling the prosecutor to abide by the agreement. However, Adult 
Probation & Parole (" AP&P")- both in the presentence report and at 
sentencing-recommended that Richardson serve one year in jail for the 
drug case, followed by three years on probation for the theft case. The 
district court ordered Richardson to serve one year in jail in both cases, to 
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run concurrently, followed by a three-year probation term in the theft case. 
The court also made several statements indicating that it believed a jail 
sentence was necessary in light of Richardson's long history of probation 
violations in the drug case and other prior cases. 
1. Was Richardson's counsel ineffective because he did not object 
to the prosecutor's failure to affirmatively recommend probation when 
AP&P had already recommended probation and the district court 
ultimately imposed probation? 
Standard of Review. Because Richardson did not raise his ineffective 
assistance clahn below, this Court reviews the issue as a matter of law. State 
v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162. 
2. Does the Court have jurisdiction to allow Richardson to 
withdraw his plea when he did not move to withdraw it before the 
district court announced sentence? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews jurisdictional issues as a 
matter of law. State v. Samul, 2015 UT App 23, ,no, 343 P.3d 719, cert. denied, 
362 P.3d 1255 (Utah), and cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1185 (2016). 
-3-
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are of central importance to this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(8) (West Supp. 2015) 
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the 
court may require that the defendant: 
(a) perform any or all of the following: 
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a· 
county jail designated by the department, after 
considering any recommendation by the court as to which 
jail the court finds most appropriate; .... 
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (West Supp. 2015) 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior 
to conviction. 
(2) 
(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only 
upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not 
knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, 
except for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion 
before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be 
announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in 
abeyance, a motion to withdraw the plea shall be made within 
30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the 
time period specified in Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued 
under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Postconviction Remedies Act, and 
Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
-4-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
As part of a plea deal in one case, the prosecution agreed to make 
sentencing recommendations in two cases. The prosecution did not make 
the agreed-to recommendations. 
In the first case (the drug case), Richardson pleaded guilty and the 
district court ordered a suspended prison sentence with three years' 
probation. R69-70. Six months into that probation, Richardson was 
arrested for retail theft and providing false personal information to a peace 
officer (the theft case). R124-26; R*l-2. 1 In the drug case, Richardson's 
probation officer submitted a probation violation report listing the charges 
in the theft case along with four other probation violations, including failure 
to participate in treatment, failure to report to AP&P, and several instances 
of drug use. R125-26. The probation officer recommended terminating 
Richardson's probation as unsuccessful and imposing a 365-day jail 
sentence. R129. 
In the theft case, Richardson pleaded guilty to retail theft. R*29. In 
exchange, the prosecutor agreed to 1) drop the false-information charge; 
2) recommend Richardson's release for pre-trial services; 3) not recommend 
1 For clarity, the State adopts the record citation format used by 
Defendant, using "R" to refer to the record in the drug case (case 131910770) 
and "R*" to refer to the record in the theft case (case 141913501). 
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prison at sentencing and "affirmatively recommend probation" so long as 
Richardson was not charged with any new crimes; and 4) recommend that 
Richardson's probation in the drug case be revoked and reinstated. R*25. 
AP&P also prepared a pre-sentence report ("PSR"). The report 
detailed Richardson's twenty-one prior convictions, mostly for drug- and 
theft-related crimes. R*41-42, 54-56. Of those prior convictions, six resulted 
in probation- excluding the drug case presently on appeal. R*56-57. 
Richardson violated the terms of his probation in all but two of those cases. 
R*56-57. 
The PSR noted that the probation violations in the drug case alone 
"play like a 'broken record."' R*45. AP&P recommended that Richardson 
serve 365 days in jail for violating probation in the drug case and that his 
probation be terminated as unsuccessful. R129, R*46. AP&P recommended 
in the theft case that Richardson be placed on three years' probation 
following any jail time served in the drug case. R*41. 
The district court held a combined sentencing and order-to-show-
cause hearing in the two cases. R*148. Defense counsel identified several 
mitigating factors in the theft case and referred to the PSR recommendation 
of probation. R*148-49. When the court turned to the State, the prosecutor 
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simply said, "We'll submit it." R*149. Defense counsel did nothing to bring 
the prosecutor's promise to the court's attention.2 
Before reiterating his counsel's request for probation, Richardson 
spoke of the progress he had made on probation and in other areas of his 
life since he had pleaded guilty in the theft case. R*149-50. The district 
court acknowledged the challenges Richardson faced and the recent 
progress he had made. R*150-51. But the court also recognized his 
repeated failures on probation. R*150-51. The court said, "I don't know 
exactly ... how you can say you've been successful in probation. It's been a 
mess." R*150-51. The district court then indicated it was inclined to impose 
a jail term for the theft case: 
I want you to know you're in the Matrix for prison. This is a 
ridiculous case to send anybody to prison on, but I will start to 
impose some jail time if I have to. You simply need to start 
complying with probation. You need to actually do what they 
tell you to do and stop using your drugs. 
R*151. The court indicated it would "follow the recommendation of the 
presentence report which really is place you back on probation." R*151. 
The court explained it was "not even sure why" AP&P "just wants you in 
jail for a year" on the probation violation, but that the court would "give 
2 A different judge, prosecutor, and defense attorney were involved 
when Richardson pleaded guilty in the theft case. R*29, 146-47. 
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[Richardson] a chance on it" because the recommendation came from the 
same agency that was supervising him. R*151. 
Be£ ore the district court could finish pronouncing the sentence in the 
theft case, the probation officer spoke up and clarified that its 
recommendation for probation in the theft case was contingent on 
Richardson serving a jail term in the drug case, and that probation should 
not start until Richardson completed a one-year jail sentence in the drug 
case. R*151-52. Thanking the probation officer for the clarification, the 
court noted that it had "hesitated" "because of how much jail time" and 
indicated that it had seen AP&P' s recommendations as "inconsistent," 
R*152, perhaps because AP&P recommended unsuccessful termination of 
probation but only jail time in the drug case, and probation with no jail time 
in the theft case. The court then picked up where it left off, sentencing 
Richardson to a suspended prison term, placing him on three years' 
probation, and ordering him to serve one year in jail. R*152. 
Defense counsel requested a stay of the jail term, coupled with 
electronic 1nonitoring, so Richardson could complete school, work, and care 
for his mother. R*153-54; 156-57. The court allowed Richardson to report 
to jail later that week to accommodate a final exam he had scheduled, but 
the court otherwise rejected the request for further leniency: 
-8-
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Viii 
The problem is ... that I read the probation violation reports 
and you've been a mess. You have a serious drug problem, a 
serious mental health problem, and because of that you just 
keep committing offenses. . . . And they've tried to send you 
into treatment facilities, you leave or you ~iolate. I have to 
give you some kind of a consequence .... 
R*156-57. 
In the drug case, Richardson admitted to the five probation violations 
and the court terminated probation and sentenced him to one year in jail, 
with the case to close upon completion of the sentence. R190; R*154-55, 157. 
The court ordered the jail sentences in the two cases to run concurrently and 
the probation term in the theft case to begin after completion of the jail 
sentence. R*l00-01, 157. 
Richardson timely appealed. R217; R*110. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: Ineffective Assistance. The prosecutor breached the plea 
agreement by failing to affirmatively recommend probation in the theft case 
and failing to recommend that probation be revoked and reinstated in the 
drug case. Richardson argues that defense counsel performed deficiently by 
not alerting the district court to the prosecutor's promise. He also makes a 
one-sentence argument that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure, 
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suggesting that he would not have received any jail time had counsel raised 
the issue. 
Richardson has not shown that defense counsel performed deficiently 
or that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's inaction. As a threshold 
matter, this Court should affirm because Richardson has inadequately 
briefed his prejudice argument. Richardson's one-sentence assertion does 
not carry his burden to prove prejudice. And because prejudice is an 
essential element of any ineffective-assistance claim, his failure to establish 
prejudice is fatal to his claim. 
Regardless, Richardson's ineffective assistance claim fails on the 
merits. Although the prosecutor breached the plea agreement by failing to 
"affinnatively" recommend probation in the theft case and by not 
recommending revocation and reinstatement of probation in the drug case, 
defense counsel nevertheless could have reasonably concluded there would 
have been no benefit to bringing the terms of the plea agreement to the trial 
court's attention. Probation does not foreclose jail time; therefore, the 
prosecutor could have recommended jail time as part of affirmatively 
recommending probation. And before the breach, the PSR had already 
recommended jail time followed by a term of probation. Thus, not only 
could defense counsel have reasonably concluded that enforcing the plea 
-10-
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agreement would have made no material difference in the actual sentence, 
he could have also concluded that doing so could have increased the chance 
of receiving a sentence that included jail time. On these facts, Richardson 
has not overcome the strong presumption that defense counsel's 
performance was reasonable. 
Nor has Richardson demonstrated that he was prejudiced. Because 
the plea agreement did not bind the prosecutor to recommend probation 
without jail time, Richardson cannot show that enforcing the plea 
agreement likely would have led to a no-jail sentence. And even if the 
prosecutor had recommended no jail time, it is unlikely the district court 
would have ruled any differently. The court made several statements 
in~icating that it believed jail time was in order; it even indicated that it 
thought that AP&P's recommended incarceration was low. So even if the 
prosecutor had recommended no jail time-which he was not bound to do 
in the first place - it likely would not have altered the court's ruling. 
Point II: Jurisdiction. Richardson argues that because of defense 
counsel's ineffectiveness, he is entitled to either resentencing or withdrawal 
of his guilty plea. But Richardson did not move for withdrawal of his guilty 
plea below. By statute, his failure to do so deprives the courts of 
jurisdiction to allow withdrawal of the plea. Thus, in the event Richardson 
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prevails on his ineffective assistance claim, the only remedy available to him 
is resentencing. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Because the prosecutor's agreement to recommend 
probation did not prohibit the prosecutor from 
recormnending a jail sentence as part of probation, 
because the district court gave Richardson probation, 
and because it is not reasonably likely that the court 
would have given Richardson probation without a jail 
sentence, Richardson has not proven that his counsel 
was ineffective when he did not alert the court that 
the prosecutor had breached his agreement to 
affirmatively recommend probation. 
A plea bargain is "essentially" a contract. Puckett v. United States, 556 
U.S. 129, 137 (2009); see generally Santobello v. United States, 404 U.S. 257, 262 
(1971) (applying contract principles to plea bargains). A prosecutor 
breaches that agreement by failing to fulfil a promise contained in the plea 
bargain. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 137.3 
When the defendant preserves a claim of breach, he need not show on 
appeal that his sentence would have been different in the absence of the 
breach. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63; see also State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 
3 Though not at issue here, there are some "limits to the contract 
analogy." State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
(explaining that plea agreements '"are like conh·acts'" but '"are not 
contracts"') (quoting United States v. Olesen, 920 F.2d 538, 541 (8th Cir. 
1990)). 
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1266, 1275 (Utah 1988) ( discussing Santobello), superseded by statute on other 
grounds as stated in State v. Swogger, 2013 UT App 164, ,I10, 306 P.3d 840. But 
a showing of prejudice is required on an unpreserved claim, because when 
a defendant fails to object in the district court, he forfeits the objection. 
Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134-35, 143; see also State v. Bond, 2015 UT 88, if 44, 361 
P.3d 104 ("[U]npreserved federal constitutional claims are not subject to a 
heightened review standard· but are to be reviewed under our plain error 
doctrine."). Thus, to get relief on appeal, a defendant must show that an 
exception to the preservation rule applies or that the failure to raise the 
issue denied the defendant effective assistance of counsel. See State v. Low, 
2008 UT 58, 119, 192 P.3d 867. Both require the defendant to show a 
reasonable likelihood that his sentence would have been different but for 
the breach. See State v. Munguia, 2011 UT 5, if13, 253 P.3d 1082; see also 
Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142 n.4 ( describing prejudice in breach cases in terms of 
the effect on the sentence). 
Here Richardson argues-and the State concedes-that the 
prosecutor breached the plea agreement by not affirmatively recommending 
probation in the theft case and by not recommending that probation be 
revoked and reinstated in the drug case. Aplt. Br. at 3. Richardson further 
argues that defense counsel was deficient in not bringing that breach to the 
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district court's attention. Aplt. Br. at 6. But for counsel's failure, Richardson 
argues, "there is a high likelihood that the court would have given Mr. 
Richardson a probationary, non-jail sentence, since both parties would have 
made the san1e recommendation." Aplt. Br. at 6-7. 4 
Richardson's ineffective assistance claim is inadequately briefed and 
also fails on the merits. Probation does not foreclose a jail term as part of 
the probation sentence. Consequently, the prosecutor's agreement to 
recommend probation did not foreclose him from asking for jail time. 
Defense counsel could have reasonably concluded that it was better to have 
the prosecutor submit the case with AP&P's recommendation without 
pushing the prosecutor to add his own affirmative recommendation that 
very well could have buttressed AP&P' s request for jail time. In any event, 
Richardson functionally got what the prosecutor was bound to recommend: 
probation rather than prison. Furthermore, given AP&P's recommendation, 
the court's ultimate sentence, and the court's statements supporting that 
sentence, probation without a jail sentence was not likely even if the 
prosecutor had affirmatively recmnmended no-jail probation. 
4 At sentencing, defense counsel never asked for probation without a 
jail term before the court pronounced sentence in the theft case. R*148-49. 
But he did request a stay of the jail term that the court imposed. R*153-54. 
-14-
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A. This Court should affirm because Richardson's one-
sentence prejudice argument is inadequately briefed. 
The extent of Richardson's prejudice argument is his one-sentence 
assertion that he would have received a more favorable sentence because 
"both parties would have made the same recommendation." Aplt Br. at 6-
7. That cursory assertion does not satisfy Richardson's burden on appeal. 
To adequately brief an argument, a party must "go beyond providing 
conclusory statements." West Jordan CihJ v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, 129, 135 
P.3d 874. Rather, the appellant must identify and develop relevant legal 
authority and present "reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). 
Failure to do so equates to failure to carry the appellant's burden of 
persuasion on appeal-a burden that "falls squarely upon an appellant." 
State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, if 21, 147 P.3d 448. The appellant may not 
"dump" that burden on the appellate court. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
To establish prejudice for an ineffective assistance claim, Richardson 
must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). The relevant result here is the 
sentence. Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142 n.4. In other words, Richardson must 
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show that had defense counsel spoken up, the prosecutor's 
recon1mendation likely would have led to a more favorable sentence.5 
As demonstrated below, infra Part B, the factual record provides 
abundant evidence to establish that the district court likely would not have 
been influenced by the prosecutor's recommendation. Given the evidence 
contrary to Richardson's position, Richardson fails to carry his burden on 
appeal with a one-sentence assertion of prejudice. To find prejudice in the 
face of such briefing would distort long-settled burdens on appeal and 
effectively create a presumption of prejudice. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 141-43 
(holding that a defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice from the 
breach of a plea agreement when defendant failed to preserve the claim). 
Because Richardson has inadequately briefed prejudice and because 
prejudice is a necessary element for relief on an ineffective-assistance claim, 
this Court should decline, on the basis of inadequate briefing, to reach the 
sole claim Richardson raises on appeal. See Utah R. App. P. 24(k). 
B. Richardson has proved neither deficient performance 
nor prejudice. 
In any event, Richardson's ineffective assistance claim fails on its 
1nerits because Richardson has not shown that defense counsel was 
5 Even when the remedy at issue is withdrawal of the guilty plea, the 
Supreme Court has clarified that the question of prejudice turns on whether 
the sentence was likely affected. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 142 n.4. 
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deficient or that Richardson was prejudiced by counsel's performance. 
Either failure is fatal to Richardson's claim. 
1. Counsel was not deficient because enforcement of the 
plea agreement would not have required the prosecutor.to 
recommend no jail time. 
To prove deficient performance, Richardson must overcome "a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To do so, he 
n1ust "persuad[ e] the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for 
counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, if 6, 89 P.3d 162 (internal 
quotation marks 0111itted). Richardson cannot do so here because counsel 
reasonably-and correctly-could have concluded that the plea agreement 
did not require the prosecutor to affirmatively recommend no jail thne. 
The prosecutor agreed to affirmatively recommend probation. But 
probation does not foreclose imposing a jail term as part of the probation. 
See Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(8)(v) (West Supp. 2015) ("While on probation, 
and as a condition of probation, the court may require that the defendant ... 
serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail .... "). And 
Richardson cites nothing in the record to show that the prosecutor agreed to 
recommend no jail time. As far as incarceration goes, the only guarantee 
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Richardson received in the plea agree1nent was that the prosecutor would 
not recmnmend prison in the retail case. It said nothing of jail. R*25. 
The recommendation for the drug case was similar, though not as 
explicit: The prosecutor agreed to recommend that probation would be 
revoked and reinstated. R*25. Implicit in that agreement is a promise not to 
recommend prison. Again, it said nothing of jail. Thus, under the terms of 
the plea agreement, Richardson was not entitled to an affirmative 
recommendation of no jail time. Any enforcement of the agreement, in 
tern1s of imprisonment, would thus have been limited to a recommendation 
of no prison. 
Furthermore, AP&P had already recommended probation in the theft 
case and had refrained from recommending prison in the drug case. R129, 
R*41. That recommendation was before the court when the prosecutor said, 
"We'll submit it." R*148-49, 156. By submitting the cases with AP&P' s 
recommendations, the prosecutor was, for all practical purposes, 
recommending no prison time. In that situation, there would have been no 
tactical reason to seek to enforce the plea agreement. In fact, defense 
counsel could have reasonably concluded that enforcing the plea agreement 
could have led to the prosecutor affirmatively recomm.ending jail time, thus 
reinforcing AP&P' s request and making a sentence that included a jail term 
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c·. 
~ 
even more likely than it already was. Thus, defense counsel acted 
reasonably in not brining that agreement to the district court's attention. 
2. In any event, the district _court's statements demonstrate 
that an affirmative recommendation from the prosecutor 
was not reasonably likely to result in no-jail probation. 
The only reason Richardson provides to establish a reasonable 
likelihood of a different sentence is his assertion that the district court 
would have been influenced by the prosecutor and defense counsel making 
the same recom1nendation. Aplt. Br. at 6-7. Richardson's prejudice 
argument thus hinges on the assumption that had defense counsel sought to 
enforce the plea agreement, both parties would have made the same 
recommendation: "a probationary, non-jail sentence." Aplt. Br. at 6-7.6 
But as shown, the prosecutor was not obligated to make the same 
recommendation as defense counsel. The prosecutor was free to 
recommend jail time as a condition of probation in the theft case. R*25. 
And even if the prosecutor had recommended that probation be revoked 
and reinstated in the drug case-rather than terminated as unsuccessful-
he s~ill could have sought jail time as a condition of that probation. Thus, 
enforcement of the plea agree1nent does not make a different sentence 
6 As noted above, defense counsel never really asked for "a 
probationary, non-jail sentence." Rather, he asked for probation and then 
requested a stay of the jail term the court imposed. R*148-49, 153-54. 
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reasonably likely. See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) ("The 
proof that such omissions prejudiced [ a defendant] must be a demonstrable 
reality and not a speculative matter." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
In fact, in the theft case Richardson got exactly what the prosecutor 
agreed to recommend- probation. And although the court did not reinstate 
Richardson's probation in the drug case, it made the resulting jail sentence 
coterminous with the jail sentence on the probation imposed in the theft 
case. So the outcome on the drug case did not change the length of 
incarceration or the period for which Richardson would be under State 
supervision. 
And even if the prosecutor had been obligated to recommend no jail 
time, Richardson still cannot demonstrate prejudice. "The likelihood of a 
different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Harrington v. 
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011). Regardless of whether, in the abstract, a joint 
recommendation by the prosecutor and defense counsel could conceivably 
influence the court's sentence, in the context of this case it is not reasonably 
likely that a joint recommendation would have led to a sentence more 
favorable than the one imposed. 
To begin with, Richardson's focus on the recommendation of "both 
parties" ignores the recommendation of another significant player: AP&P. 
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Aplt. Br. at 7._ Although AP&P recommended only probation for the theft 
case, it recommended that Richardson serve one year in jail for violating 
probation in the drug case and that his probation be terminated in that case 
as unsuccessful. R*41, 46. The joint recommendation of the prosecutor and 
defense counsel thus would have been undercut by AP&P's contrary 
recommendation. 
But the best indication that the outcome would not have been 
different is the many statements the district court made indicating its 
inclination to impose jail time in light of Richardson's history of crimes and 
prior failures on probation. The PSR detailed a long history of drug and 
theft crimes and a poor track record with probation. R*41-42, 54-57. In 
fact, Richardson had violated probation in four of the previous six cases in 
which he was sentenced to probation. R*56-57. The first violation led to the 
revocation and unsuccessful termination of probation; the second led to 
revocation and reinstatement; the third led to revocation and reinstatement, 
followed by another violation that led to revocation and reinstatement, 
followed by yet another violation that led to revocation and a jail sentence; 
and the fourth led to revocation and a jail sentence. R*56-57. Furthermore, 
in the drug case now on appeal Richardson admitted to five probation 
violations, including the commission of the retail theft. R276. 
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Referring to Richardson's troubled history with probation, the district 
court said, "I don't know exactly ... how you can say you've been 
successful in probation. It's been a mess." R*150-~1. The court reiterated 
that sentiment later and added, "You have a serious drug problem, a serious 
1nental health problem, and because of that you just keep committing 
offenses." R*156-57. The court stated that it would "start to impose some 
jail time" if necessary. R*151. The court also indicated it was skeptical of 
AP&P's recommendation of only one year imprisonment, stating, "I'm not 
even sure why" AP&P "just wants you in jail for a year" on the probation 
violation. R*151. The court concluded, "[T]hey've tried to send you into 
treatment facilities, you leave or you violate. I have to give you some kind 
of a consequence .... " R*157. 
The district court's statements, Richardson's long criminal record, and 
his unsuccessful probation history all demonstrate that a more lenient 
sentence was not more likely had defense counsel brought the plea 
agreement to the court's attention. And even if a different outcome were 
conceivable, it was not substantially or even reasonably likely. See 
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112. 
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II. 
Because Richardson did not move for withdrawal of 
his plea before announcement of sentence, the courts 
have authority to order only specific performance 
(resentencing) as a remedy, in the event Richardson 
prevails on appeal. 
Richardson argues that, if he establishes ineffective assistance, he is 
entitled to be resentenced or to have his guilty plea withdrawn in the theft 
case. Aplt. Br. at 3, 5. But see Aplt. Br. at 7 (requesting only resentencing 
where the prosecutor specifically performs what he promised). Neither this 
Court nor the district court has jurisdiction to allow Richardson to 
withdraw his guilty plea because Richardson did not request that remedy 
before announcement of sentence. 7 
When the State breaches a plea agreement, the court may generally 
choose between two remedies: withdrawal of the guilty plea or 
resentencing with the benefit of the State's promised performance. Puckett, 
556 U.S. at 137-38; State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, 'if17, 95 P.3d 1203. But the 
7 Jurisdictional arguments are typically threshold questions that must 
be addressed before reaching the merits of a claim. See State v. Mardoniz-
Rosado, 2014 UT App 128, ,rs, 328 P.3d 864. But the jurisdictional issue here 
goes only to the courts' authority to order one of two remedies. See Puckett, 
556 U.S. at 137-38 (describing withdrawal and resentencing as two possible 
re1nedies for breach of the plea agreement). Because Richardson's 
ineffective assistance claim is inadequately briefed and fails on its merits, 
this Court need not reach the question of which remedy is jurisdictionally 
permissible. 
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Constitution does not require one remedy over the other. See Santobello, 404 
U.S. at 262-63 (explaining that choice among re1nedies is left to discretion of 
state courts). 
In Utah, the legislature has chosen to limit the courts' authority to 
allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. The Utah Code states, 11 A 
request to withdraw a plea of guilty ... shall be made by motion before 
sentence is announced." Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(b) (West Supp. 2015). 
That limitation is jurisdictional. State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1 if 18, 247 P.3d 344; 
Grimmett, 2007 UT 11, if 8. When a defendant fails to request withdrawal 
before sentence is announced, the availability of that remedy is limited to 
the post-conviction relief process. See Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(c) (" Any 
challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified m 
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, 
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Postconviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure."). 8 
Richardson did not move to withdraw his guilty plea. R*148-58. The 
first time he has requested such relief is in his brief on appeal. Aplt. Br. at 3, 
5. Therefore, if Richardson were to prevail on appeal, at most he would be 
entitled to resentencing. The remedy of withdrawal of a guilty plea for 
someone in Richardson's situation may only be sought and obtained, if at 
all, through the post-conviction relief process. See Utah Code Ann. §77-13-
6(2)(c); id. §78B-9-104(1)(d) (West Supp. 2015) (listing ineffective assistance 
as a ground for post-conviction relief). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
8 This Court's opinion in State v. Smit is not to the contrary. That case 
held that the choice between the remedies for breach of a plea agreement is 
left to "the discretion of the trial judge." 2004 UT App 222, 4f17. But the 
defendant in Smit had made a motion to withdraw his guilty plea that was 
timely under an earlier, controlling version of the statute. See id. ,i14-5; see 
also Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(b) (West 2004) historical and statutory 
notes (noting that prior version of the statute required a request to 
withdraw guilty plea to be made by motion "within 30 days after the entry 
of the plea"); Grimmett, 2007 UT 11, ~15 (noting that the supreme court had 
interpreted the phrase "entry of the plea" in the earlier version of the statute 
to refer to "the date of enh-y of final judgment"). 
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Addendum A 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH t 
STATE OF UTAH, STATEMENT OF DEF-NDANT 
IN SUPPORT OF GUIUfY PLEA 
Plaintiff, AND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
,re-
,. -'• Case No~ 141913501 
SPENCER RICHARDSON, 
Defendant. 
I, Spencer Richardson, hereby acknowledge and certify that I have ., een advised of 
and that I understand the following facts and rights: I 
l 
A. 
Notification of Charges 
I am pleading guilty ( or no contest) to the following crimes: 
Crime & Statutory 
Provision 
Retail Theft w/ Priors 
Degree 
3 
; 
I 
Punishment 
I 
Min/Max and/or 
Minimum Mandatory 
o-s usP, $:b-sooo + 90% 
II 
l 
1 have received a copy of the Infonnation against me. I have read it, or had it read 
to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime to which I am ~leading guilty. 
i 
The elements of the crime(s) to ·which I. am pleading guilty ( or no cbntest) are: 
That on or about November 24. 2014 in Salt Lake Countv .. Spencer Richai.dson. a party to 
the offense. did knowinglv take possession. of. conceal.. carry away. transfdr or cause to be 
carried away any merchandise displaved, held. stored or offered for ~ale in a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining such merchand~se or with the 
intention of deprivin2: the merchant permanentlv of the possession. use orlbenefit of such 
merchandise without paying the retail va]ue of such merchandise and hbd a qualifying 
offense w/in ten years. I 
Revised September 28, 2011 
00022 
I 
I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I comm~tted the crimes 
listed above. I stipulate and agree that the following facts describe my conduct and the 
conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable. These facts prdvide a basis for 
the court to accept my guilty pleas and prove the elements of the crime(sJ to which I am 
pleading guilty ( or no contest): 'I 
On November 24 .. 2014. in Salt Lake County. Mr. Richardson knowingly carried away 
merchandise from the Sports Authority and intended to retain that mercliandise without 
paving for those items and had a rior uali ine conviction in case 12190181 I. 
Waiver of Constitutional Rights 
i 
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the ~ollowing rights 
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understan~ that if I plead 
guilty I will give up all the following rights: I 
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorrley and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney wilJ be appointed by the court at no ~ost to me. I 
understand that I might later, if the judge detennined that I was able, be reqf ired to pay for 
the appointed lawyer's service to me. .
1 
I have not waived my right to counsel. 
If I have not waived my right to counsel, my ;I attorney is 
M. E. Larson. .My attorney and I have ful1y discussed this statement, my'trights, and the 
consequences of my guilty plea(s) . 
.Jury Trial. I know that I have a right to a speedy and public trial y an impartial 
(unbiased) jury and that I will be giving up that right by pleading guilty. 
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know that ifl were to have 
a trial, a) I would have the right to see and observe the witnesses who testitied against me 
and b) my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would have the 
opportunity to cross-examine alJ of the witnesses who testified against me.: 
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a triJI, I could call 
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain subpoenas requiring!the attendance 
and testimony of those witnesses. If I could not afford to pay for the witn,_!sses to appear, 
the State would pay those costs. 
. 
Right to testify and privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to 
have a trial, I would have the .right to testify on my own behalf. I also knot that if I chose 
not to tesfrfy) no one could make me testify or make me give evidence ag1inst myself. I 
also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they coui d not hold my 
refusal to testify against me. 
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Presumption of innocence and burden of proof. I know that ifi I do not plead 
I 
guilty, I am presumed innocent until the State proves that I am guilty pf the charged 
crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead --~ot guilty," and 
my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden ~f proving each 
I 
element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict 
must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty. j 
I understand that ifl plead guilty, I give up the presumption ofinnocJnce and will be 
admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above. I 
I 
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convictd by a jury or 
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I 1ould not afford 
the costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I under~tand that I am 
giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty. I understand that if I wish to 
appeal my sentence I must file a notice of appeal within 30 days after illy sentence is 
I 
entered. i 
I 
j 
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving arr'.r giving up all 
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above. 
Consequences of Entering a Guilty ( or No Contest) Plea(! 
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be iniposed for each 
I 
crime to which I am pleading guilty. I know that by pleading guilty to a crinhe that carries a 
mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a mandatory 1·1enalty for that 
crime. I know my sentence may include a prison tem1, fine, or both. 
I know that in addition to a fine, a ninety percent (90%) surcharge w,iill be imposed. 
I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) :lof my crimes, 
including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed a~ part of a plea 
agreement. 
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is !nore than one 
crime involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another ( consecutively), or they 
may run at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged anl!additional fine 
for each crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting 
sentencing on another offense of which I have been convicted or whicTh I have plead 
guilty), my guilty plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being iilnposed on me. 
If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was i111prisoned or on 
parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences unless the court 
finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be inappro~riate. 
,, 
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' ! 
Plea agreement. My guilty plea is the result of a plea agreement between myself 
and the prosecuting attorney. All the promises, duties, and provisio~s of the plea 
agreement, if any, are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: 
! 
Count 2 false ersonal information to a eace officer is dismissed . Thb state a rees to 
recommend Mr. Richardson's release at the time of his plea. The partie aeree that Mr. 
Richardson shall get a presentence report from AP &P. At sentencing. the hate agrees not 
to recommend prison and affirmatively recommend probation .. so long as Mr. Richardson 
is not charged with any new crimes between the time of his release and lthe time of his 
sentencing. The state also aizrees to recommend that Mr. Richardson 'ls probation be 
revoked and reinstated in case 13 I 910770. J 
Trial judge not bound. I know that any charge or sentencin~\ concession or 
recommendation of probation or suspended sentence, including a reductioi of the charges 
for sentencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecud. g attorney are 
not binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they 
believe the judge may do are not binding on the judge. 
Immigration/Deportation: I understand that if I am not a Unite , States citizen, 
my plea(s) today may, or even will> subject me to deportation under! United States 
immigration laws and regulations, or otherwise adversely affect my imrtjigration status, 
which may include permanently barring my re-entry into the United States!. I understand 
that if I have questions about the effect of my plea on my immigration 1tatus, I should 
consult with an immigration attorney. · 
Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness 
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice. No force, threats, of 
unlawful influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty J No promises 
except those contained in this statement have been made to me. I 
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my ', ttorney, and I 
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know t~at I am free to 
change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not wisp to make any 
changes because all of the statements are correct. l 
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. 
I am years of age. I have attended school through the , grade. I 
can read and understand the English language. If I do not understadd English, an 
interpreter has been provided to me. I was not under the influence 11 of any drugs, 
medication, or intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I d~cided to plead 
guilty. 1 am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants 
which impair my judgment. 
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I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be men~ally capable of 
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I ~m free of any 
mental disease, defect, or impainnent that would prevent me from understaI: ding ·what I am 
doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntaiily entering my plea. 
I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty plea(s), I mu ·
1
t file a written 
motion to withdraw my plea(s) before sentence is announced. I understand that for 
a plea held iu abeyance, a motion to withdraw from the plea agreement must be made 
within 30 days of pleading guilty. I will only be allowed to withdraiv my plea if I 
show that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. I understand that any 
challenge to my plea(s) made after sentencing must be pursu~d under the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act in Title 78, Chapter 35a, and Rule 6SC of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this "1.) day of __ D_u=·'-=t_---"w-~_r ______ ,-----~ 2o}t.r 
Certificate of Defense Attorney 
!i 
I certify that I am the attorney for 
, the defendant above, and that 1 know he/she has read the statement or that , have read it to 
him/her; I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully up.derstands the 
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To ~he best of my 
knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the elements of tlte c.rime(s) and 
the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stafed; and these, 
along with the other representations and declarations made by the defendant in the 
foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. {:' /, 
gr,,f fjt(,~ 
--+-:-::a..--=--------...------
A TT ORNE Y FOR DEFENDANT 
Bar No. ' 2 0 ~" 
------
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney 
I 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in thb case against 
, defendant. I have reviewed this Statement ofDefendant and find that thelfactual basis of 
the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s) is true Jd correct. No 
improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea has been of(ered defendant. 
The plea negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in th~ attached Plea 
Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court. There is r4asonable cause 
to believe that the evidence would support the conviction of defendant Ht the offense( s) 
for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance f the plea(s) would serve the 
public interest. 
Bar No. ~dw ?:} PROSECUTillG ATTOr:.· ~y 
Revised September 28, 2011 6 00027 
Order 
Based on the facts set fo11h in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the 
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses 
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(~) is/are freely, 
knowingly, and voluntarily made. 1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the 
crirne(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered. 
Dated this :Z.1- day of __ lJ_(_·"' !-_~· __________ _,, uY/ 
DISTRICT COURT JUD@E 
i 
I 
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Addendum B 
A d dendum B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) CASE NO. 141913501 
) 
SPENCER SCOTT RICHARDSON ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
) 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE PAUL B. PARKER 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
HEARING 
ELECTRONICALLY RECORDED ON 
MAY 4, 2015 
Transcribed by: Colleen C. Southwick, RPR/CSR 
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APPEARANCES 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
MICHAEL P. BOEHM 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
RUDY J. BAUTISTA 
Attorney at Law 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, can we address the Spencer 
Richardson matter, please. There are two of them. 
THE COURT: This is 131910770 and 141913501. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, we're here for sentencing 
as well as an order to show cause. 
THE COURT: Mr. Bautista for the defendant. And who 
is here for the State? 
MR. BOEHM: I am here. 
THE COURT: Mr. Boehm for the State. Are you Spencer 
Scott Richardson? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: What's your birthdate? 
THE DEFENDANT: 7/29/69. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Bautista. 
MR. BAUTISTA: As I indicated, your Honor, we're here 
for sentencing on case ending 3501 and an order to show cause 
in case ending 0770. We'd like to address the sentencing 
first. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, there is a presentence 
report submitted. Speaking with Mr. Richardson there are some 
minor issues he'd had, however, they do not change the 
recommendation in the presentence report so discussing that 
we'd like to go forward with sentencing at this time. 
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This is a matter where Mr. Richardson has been 
suffering from mental health issues and has been making the 
most that he can to move his life forward. He's involved in 
going to school to make himself a better person. He has a 
final this Wednesday. In addition to that, he's been 
struggling to keep his life in order because his mother suffers 
from Parkinson's disease. He does live with his mother and he 
does take care of his mother. And he's not using it as an 
excuse, but part of his issues have been following through with 
his counseling to make sure he stays substance abuse free. 
He has met with ARS and has kept completing the 
evaluation and is looking forward to complying with probation 
if he's given that privilege as well as following through with 
all the counseling recommendations and further schooling 
himself to make sure he moves forward from this occurrence and 
makes himself a better person. 
THE COURT: The State. 
MR. BOEHM: We'll submit it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Richardson, you have the right to 
make a statement before I impose sentence. Is there anything 
you'd like to say? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. It's just been 
recently in probably the last six months that I've really 
realized the frailty of my mother, that she's in her twilight, 
you know, and helping her out. You know I was 13 days old when 
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I was adopted by her and now I've been able to give back to 
her. Our relationship wasn't really that good until recently, 
you know, for me to tie her shoes, to go on small walks and go 
to school and stuff. You know I did a lot of wrong things. I 
violated my probatibn and stuff. I'm sorry for that. 
The last six months I've been doing good complying 
with probation. I've taken their classes and stuff. It's just 
a huge concern. I don't want to miss out on this last little 
bit with my mother. Like I said, I've been doing good with 
probation the last few months, you know, going to my classes, 
attending things. I know -- you know I've got a final this 
Wednesday. I was a very selfish person before and now I've 
realized my life impacts a lot of people and especially my dear 
mother. She wasn't able it make it today because of her 
physical condition. 
I'm asking that you allow me to continue with 
probation, get a job. I'm working with my bishop. I've been 
referred to the Deseret Industries and stuff. I also took an 
employment class with the AP&P which was a real eye opener. 
Vocational rehab has accepted me. I showed the papers to my 
lawyer. Attending meetings. I'm just trying to do a 180. I 
know I've not got a pretty past, but I can only go forward from 
today. 
THE COURT: Okay. Sir, I mean, I don't know 
exactly and I know you have some struggles -- how you can 
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say you've been successful in probation. It's been a mess. 
THE DEFENDANT: I'm just talking about the last few 
months that I've been 
THE COURT: It's true I haven't had any recent 
allegations that you have been a problem. 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: But regardless of your mother's health, 
none of that is rationalization for this. I want you to know 
you're in the Matrix for prison. This is a ridiculous case to 
send anybody to prison on, but I will start to impose some jail 
time if I have to. You simply need to start complying with 
probation. You need to actually do what they tell you to do 
and stop using your drugs. You understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Having said that, I will follow the 
recommendation of the presentence report which really is place 
you back on probation. Frankly I'm not even sure why the 
probation violation just wants you in jail for a year, but 
given it's from the same agency I'll give you a chance on it. 
On the third degree felony, retail theft, I'll impose 
zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, a fine of $5000 
plus a 90 percent surcharge. I will suspend the imposition of 
all of the --
AP&P AGENT: Your Honor --
THE COURT: Yes. 
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AP&P AGENT: Agent (inaudible) with Adult Probation & 
Parole. 
THE COURT: Are you his agent? 
AP&P AGENT: I am, sir. Also the officer of the PSI 
as well as the order to show cause. 
THE COURT: Thank you for explaining yourself, sir. 
AP&P AGENT: With the sentencing (inaudible) 
contingent upon the sentencing of the order to show cause to 
the jail time. 
THE COURT: So you want a year and then --
AP&P AGENT: Yes, sir. The new probation period 
would not begin until the conclusion of jail time at the close 
of the prior case. 
THE COURT: Thank you very much. I appreciate that 
explanation because that's why I hesitated is because of how 
much jail time. I usually write that when I go down in front 
of it and I was frankly a little bit confused because of the 
recommendations that I saw to be inconsistent, but I will 
suspend, again, the prison time all but a year in the Salt Lake 
County Jail. Place you on probation to Adult Probation and 
Parole for 36 months on the following conditions: 
First of all, that you follow the usual and ordinary 
conditions of probation, that is that you sign your probation 
agreement, that you not have any further offenses, you comply 
with all the laws. You allow yourself to be searched, your 
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person, your vehicle, your home. I will also authorize Adult 
Probation & Parole to really do whatever evaluation and 
assessment they need to do. 
Clearly you need a mental health evaluation and 
further treatment. Whatever programming they direct you I want 
you to enter in to complete. You clearly need a substance 
abuse evaluation, enter into whatever programming that they are 
going to require you to do as well. Complete that. No drugs, 
no alcohol. Can't possess, use, consume any of those 
substances. Can't be around any people who are, be in bars or 
parties where it normally is. 
You are to follow your doctor's care to take that 
medication which is prescribed for you. Take a theft cat class 
and complete cognitive therapy. You're also to pay restitution 
in the amount of $428.88. 
Any questions? Take him into custody --
MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor? 
THE COURT: for his year in jail. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, in regards to the year in 
jail, we're asking for several alternatives. No. 1, because he 
has a final on this Wednesday and he's been checking in with 
probation, if you do order that he be incarcerated, we ask he 
be allowed to surrender on Friday. He understands if he fails 
to surrender, then that would be a probation violation that 
would warrant a prison sentence imposed. In the alternative 
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we're asking if the Court would consider imposing the jail but 
staying its imposition for 95 days, put him on an electronic 
monitoring with AP&P and see how he progresses from that point 
in time on in consideration that he cares for his mother. That 
would allow him to finish his exams so that he can have 
completion with college education and allow him to have better 
opportunities for employment so that he can care for his 
mother. 
He understands that with jail being imposed that it 
can be imposed at any moment if he violates the stay. And upon 
review if he hasn't been 110 percent in compliance and really 
convinced AP&P otherwise, then he'll go to jail at that point. 
THE COURT: Let's deal with the order to show cause 
because that's related to it. He is charged on a probation 
violation report dated last year, is it not, 2014? I think it 
was signed December 10th 2014. The affidavit which supports 
it is dated the 9th of December 2014. Is that correct? 
MR. BOEHM: Yes. 
THE COURT: Sir, you have the right to have the State 
prove that you violated your probation. If you admit any of 
these, you will relieve them of that burden. Is it his intent 
to admit or deny the allegations? 
MR. BAUTISTA: No, admit, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Which ones will he be admitting? 
All of them? 
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MR. BAUTISTA: All of them, yes. 
THE COURT: Okay. Sir, you're charged with using a 
controlled substance on August the 11th and the 2sth , 2014; 
with having used a controlled substance on August 1sth , 2014; 
having failed to complete the treatment as directed on 
August 27th of 2014; with having failed to report as directed 
on Septem];:>er the 4th, 2014, by having committed the offense of 
retail theft, I believe the one he was sentenced on on 
November 24 th , 2014, and having committed the offense of 
false information to a peace officer on or about the 24 th of 
November 2014. 
Do you admit or deny these allegations? 
MR. BAUTISTA: Your Honor, except for the false 
information he admits. The false information was --
THE COURT: All right. We'll strike that one. To 
allegations 1 through 5, admit or deny? 
THE DEFENDANT: I admit them, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. I am accepting those 
admissions. Find that you have violated your probation. 
Does AP&P want to say anything further than what you 
said before? And you heard their request is to try and use the 
jail sentence as some kind of further stick. What do you 
think? 
AP&P AGENT: Your Honor, I did talk to his attorney 
prior to this. We are willing to allow him to self report as 
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of Friday so he can complete that. I did confirm with the 
officer. He said he was taking one class at the college and he 
does have finals this week. 
THE COURT: Okay. What about their idea of letting 
him out to take care of his mother? 
AP&P AGENT: In all honesty, your Honor, he knew this 
was happening at the time this offense occurred and Itm not 
(inaudible). 
(The transcriber cannot hear what the probation 
officer is saying. There is too much background 
noise.) 
THE COURT: All right. I'll let him report on this 
Friday. When is the test? 
THE DEFENDANT: It's Wednesday. 
THE COURT: But you need to report by -- well, if the 
test is on Wednesday, let's have you report -- when is it on 
Wednesday? 
THE DEFENDANT: I believe it is 9:10 we start. 
THE COURT: When is the test done? 
THE DEFENDANT: I believe they allow two hours for 
it. It would be nice to be able to kind of help set things up 
for my mother. 
THE COURT: You're going to be back in on Wednesday 
at 5:00. The problem is this is that I read the probation 
violation reports and you've been a mess. You have a serious 
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drug problem, a serious mental health problem, and because of 
that you just keep committing offenses. 
THE DEFENDANT: Right. 
THE COURT: You need to be able to succeed. And 
they've tried to send you into treatment facilities, you leave 
or you violate. I have to give you some kind of a consequence, 
okay? 
THE DEFENDANT: Is the 90 days on the ankle 
monitor 
THE COURT: The 90 days is not on the table. You 
report Wednesday. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. I will do that. 
THE COURT: Okay. So the sentence then on the 
probation violation is one year and closed then. He'll be on 
probation only on the felony matter and the jail time on the 
felony matter will run concurrent with the jail time here, so 
it will just be one year and then he'll be back out on 
probation. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Good luck to you, sir. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Was the whole case to be revoked and 
reinstated or? 
THE COURT: Closed. 
MR. BAUTISTA: Closed. 
THE COURT: That's what I said, closed. 
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13 
THE COURT: You talk to your attorney about that and 
we'll see later on. 
(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED 
MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.) 
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County of Utah 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
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I, Colleen C. Southwick, Registered Professional 
Reporter for the State of Utah, do certify that the foregoing 
transcript was taken down by me stenographically from an 
electronic recording and thereafter transcribed; 
That the same constitutes a true and correct 
transcription of the said proceedings; 
That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with any 
of the parties herein or their counsel, and that I am not 
interested in the events thereof. 
WITNESS my hand at Provo, Utah, this 3rd day of 
August, 2015. 
Colleen C. Southwick, RPR, CSR 
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